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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
vs. 
SEAN THOMPSON, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Utah Supreme Court 
Case No. 20020307-SA 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 20000071-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over both subject matter and procedural issues that are 
relevant to this case. Pursuant to Rule 46 (a)(4) of the Utah R. App. P., jurisdiction of this Court 
is properly invoked because of the following considerations: 
A. The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter was filed on March 7, 
2002. That opinion decided important questions of Utah state law, namely the scope and 
constitutionality of portions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-20 l-(l)(b). 
B. While it affirmed the validity and constitutionality of part of § 76-9-201 (l)(b), 
the Court of Appeals also held that other parts of the statute were facially overbroad and, 
therefore unconstitutional. As provided in Rule 46(a)(4) of the Utah R. App.P., the final 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (l)(b) has not yet been, but should be, settled by this 
Court. 
C. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(g) confers appellate jurisdiction upon this court to 
determine and/or review questions of whether a statute of this state complies with requirements 
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of the United States and Utah constitutions. 
D. On April 8, 2002, Plaintiff-Petitioner ("Provo") filed with this Court a petition 
for a writ of certiorari. On August 29, 2002, this Court granted that petition so|that it could 
determine whether all or part of § 76-9-201 (l)(b) is constitutional. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201 
(1) A person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject to prosebution in the 
jurisdiction where the telephone call originated or was received if with intent to annoy, 
alarm another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten harass, or creating a risk thereof, the 
person: 
(a) 
(b) 
(d) 
makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation 
makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not 
ensues, or after having been told not to call back, 
telephone of another to ring repeatedly or contiguously 
makes a telephone call and insults, taunts or ch^llen: 
recipient of the telephone call or any person at 
a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly 
makes a telephone call and uses any lewd or prdf< 
the 
ensues; 
conversation 
causes the 
sly; 
ges the 
called number in 
response, 
ane language or 
(2) 
suggests any lewd or lascivious act; or 
(e) makes a telephone call and threatens to inflict injury, physical 
harm, or damage to any person or the property 4f any person. 
Telephone harassment is a class B misdemeanor. 
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United States Constitution, Amendment I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of 
grievances. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV 
... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person, of life 
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 15 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the 
press... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about May 1, 1999, Thompson was charged by Information with Telephone 
Harassment, a class B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201, in Fourth District Court, 
Provo Department. On October 29, 1999, a bench trial was held before the Honorable Anthony 
W. Schofiled. After testimony from the alleged victim, the responding officer, and Thompson, 
the Court ruled in favor of the City of Provo and convicted Thompson of telephone harassment. 
On December 20, 1999, Thompson was sentenced to 15 hours of community service and a $250 
fine. Thompson filed a timely appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. That court affirmed the 
conviction of Thompson, relying in part on language in the second part of subsection (l)(b) of 
the 1999 telephone harassment statute. Provo City v. Thompson, 2002 UT Apt 63,1J26, 44 P.3d 
828, 834. The Court of Appeals also held that the first part of subsection (l)(b) was facially 
overbroad and unconstitutional. Thompson, 2002 UT App 63, ffi[21, 27, 4 4 p-fd a t 833> 834-35. 
Subsequently on November 21, 2002, Provo City filed an appeal with the Utalf Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In the bench trial the alleged victim, Ms. Thayer, testified that Thompslon called 
numerous times within the hour. (Tr. at 7). Thayer testified that she asked 
his phone calls. (Tr. at 8). The responding police officer, Bastian, testified 
the home of Thayer investigating the telephone calls, Thompson again called, 
picked up the receiver and spoke with Thompson. (Tr. at 13). Bastian re 
Thompson at Thompson's home. (Tr. at 14). Upon arriving at Thompson's 
indicated that he smelled alcohol and Thompson admitted to drinking beer. ( 
Thompson took the stand and testified that he received a telephone call 
she told Thompson that she was going to harm herself (suicide) and possibly 1 
daughter. (Tr. at 17 & 20). At the time Thayer lived alone with the couples 
45-5). Thompson testified that he called Thayer numerous times because he 
danger to herself and to Thompson's daughter. (Tr. at 21). Thompson 
because he had been taught in school to keep calling to assist a person 
Thompson to cease 
that while he was at 
Iwherein Bastian 
quested to meet with 
qome Bastian 
r. at 14). 
from Thayer and 
harm Thompson's 
young daughter. (R. 
Reared Thayer was a 
repeatedly called Thayer 
threatening suicide. (Tr. 
at 20). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has declared in two separate cases that Utah Code Ann. § 76-
9-201 (1999) is unconstitutionally overbroad. (See Provo City v. Thompson, 442 Utah Adv. Rep. 
24, 2002 UT App 63, 44 P.3d 828, and Provo City v. Whatcott, 2000 UT App 86, 1 P.3d 1113, 
(Ut. App. 2000)). Respondent argues that these decisions should be affirmed. The telephone 
harassment statute in this case has a real and substantial deterrent effect on protected speech and 
a court's narrowing construction of the statute is not possible. Because the statute is overbroad 
and unconstitutional it must be stricken down because it violates the guarantees of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as well as Article I, §§ 7 and 15 of the 
Utah Constitution. Based on these considerations the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in 
this case should be affirmed and Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1999) should be struck down on 
the basis that it is unconstitutionally overbroad. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
UTAH CODE ANN. 76-9-201 IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD 
BECAUSE IT AIMS AT REGULATING CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
SPEECH. 
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that parts of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 
(1999) were unconstitutionally overbroad on its face.. 
Faced with overbreadth and vagueness attacks on a statute or ordinance, our first task is 
to determine whether the enactment makes unlawful a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail 
and we should then examine the facial vagueness challenge. If it does, it may be held 
facially invalid even if it also has legitimate application. 
Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted). 
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In fact the Court of Appeals had already heard and decided in Provo City v. Whatcott, 
2000 UT App 86, 1 P.3d 1113 (Ut. App. 2000) that subsection (a) of Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201 
was unconstitutionally overbroad. 
"An enactment which is unconstitutionally overbroad 'is one which does not aim 
specifically at evils within the knowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within 
its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of 
speech or the press.'" Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97, 60 S.Ct. 736, 741-42 (1940)) (additional citation 
omitted). 
The Court of Appeals said of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201; "presumably, the Legislature 
intended to prohibit threatening and menacing calls, and calls that would provoke a breach of the 
peace. This is certainly within the Legislature's power, and does not offend tne First 
Amendment... But section 76-9-201 sweeps even more broadly. Under subsection (a), the statute 
prohibits any 'telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues,' where the caller has 
'recklessly creatfed] a risk' of'annoy[ing], alarm[ing]..., intimidatfing], offend[ing], abus[ing], 
threaten[ing], harassing], or frighten[ing]' the recipient." Provo City v. Thompson, 2002 UT 
App 63 at H17. 
The Court gave several reasons why the statute would "prohibit a potentially huge 
universe of otherwise legitimate telephone calls." Provo City v. Whatcott, 200 UT App. 86 at 
1fl[10-l 1. These examples included, "(1) unwanted telephone solicitations made to a private 
home during the dinner hour; (2) calls from a mother to 'a young adult who has recently moved 
out of the family home,' which the mother makes in order 'to make sure he i(s alright,' and which 
she continues to make despite 'his exasperation (frequently and vocally expressed)'; (3) calls 
from 'a consumer... [to] the seller or producer of a product to express dissatisfaction of product 
performance;' (4) calls from 'a businessman... [to] another to protest failure to perform a 
contractual obligation;' and (5) calls from 'a constituent... [to] his legislator to protest the 
legislator's stand on an issue.'" Id. at 1fl[12, 14 (quoting State v. Dronso, 279 N.W.2d 710, 714 
(Wis.Ct.App. 1979)). The Court then went on to explain why all of these calls would be 
prohibited under Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201; "... because of the callers' conscious disregard of 
the substantial likelihood that the call would annoy [the recipient and thus] bring the call within 
the statute's ambit." Id. at [^12. 'These few examples show that the overbreadth of subsection 
(a) is [both] real and substantial." Id. at 1J14. 
A statute that legitimately punishes some speech but which might be construed to inhibit 
a substantial amount of protected speech may be unconstitutionally overbroad. New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768-69, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3360-61, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). Although the 
statute as applied to the particular defendant raising the challenge may comport with 
constitutional limitations on a state's power to prohibit expressive activity, the danger that broad 
readings could result in unconstitutional applications may be enough to render the entire statute 
infirm. This sort of challenge, which implicates hypothetical applications of a statute to the 
speech of third persons not before the court, constitutes an exception to traditional rules of 
standing, New YorkState Club Ass 'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11,108 S.Ct. 2225, 2233, 
101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988), but this exception is justified by the recognition that the interests the first 
amendment is designed to protect "may be inhibited almost as easily by the potential or 
threatened use of power as by the actual exercise of that power." Id. (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 
1 
310 U.S. 88, 97-98, 60 S.Ct. 736, 741-42, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940)); see also Feriber, 458 U.S. at 
768, 102 S.Ct. at 3360-61 (describing deterrent effect on protected speech of overly broad 
statutes); Village ofSchaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.p. 620, 634, 100 
S.Ct. 826, 834-35, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980). 
"[Overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as welll, judged in 
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 41J U.S. 601, 615, 93 
S.Ct. 2908, 2917-18, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). The defendant must demonstrate "a realistic danger 
that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of 
parties not before the [c]ourt" before a statute will be struck down as facially overbroad. City 
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801, 104 S.Q. 2118, 2126-27, 80 
L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). 
"Facial challenges to overly broad statutes are allowed not primarily for the benefit of the 
litigant, but for the benefit of society-to prevent the statute from chilling the 
rights of other parties not before the court." Secretary of State of Maryland v. 
Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984). For this reason, any sense of 
injustice created by the windfall to a guilty defendant is vastly outweighed by the benefit to 
society in protecting the right to free expression. Id. 
First Amendment 
Joseph H. Munson 
SUBSECTION (b) OF UTAH CODE ANN. 76-9-201 WAS ALSO 
CORRECTLY FOUND TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD. 
For the same reasons discussed above the Court of Appeals also held 
of Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201 was unconstitutionally overbroad. Subsection i 
parts. The first part prohibits the "making of repeated telephone calls, whether or not a 
that subsection (b) 
b) contains two 
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conversation ensues," if the caller acts with the requisite intent, i.e., "with intent to annoy, alarm 
another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or frighten any person at the called number or 
recklessly creates a risk thereof." Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201 (l)(b) (1999). The second prohibits 
the "causing of the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or continuously" if the caller "has 
been told not to call back," and if the caller acts with the requisite intent. Id. 
Subsection (a) prohibits "a single telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues," if 
made with the requisite intent. Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201 (l)(a) (1999). The first part of 
subsection (b) criminalizes "repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation ensues," if 
made with the requisite intent. Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201 (l)(b) (1999). Prohibiting repeated 
calls rather than only single calls does little to narrow the field of otherwise legitimate 
communications that subsection (a) unconstitutionally "sweeps within its ambit." Huber, 786 
P.2datl375. 
Once again the Court of Appeals cited several examples of how this could be 
unconstitutional by prohibiting protected speech. "The telephone solicitor who attempts to call 
again 'at a more convenient time'; the overly anxious mother who calls her grown son repeatedly 
despite his expressed exasperation; the consumer who calls customer service the first, second, 
third, and fourth times her computer crashes; the businessman who leaves a voice mail message 
for his counterpart at another company regarding an unperformed contractual term, then calls 
again later to speak in person, and then calls a third time - or twenty times- to "keep the pressure 
on"; and the concerned citizen who calls on different occasions to chastize his legislator for her 
stance on varied issues might all be subject to prosecution under the first part of subsection (b), 
as well as under subsection (a). Provo City v. Thompson, AA P.3d 828, 833 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002). 
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Again, it is the caller's "conscious disregard of the substantial likelihood that 
would annoy the recipient that brings the call within the statute's ambit." Whhtcott, 2000 UT 
pnd repeat calls in 
is... overbroad and 
App. 86, 1 P.3d 1113. The Court went on to hold that "because both the first 
the above scenarios are legitimate, we hold that the first part of subsection (b)| 
unconstitutional." Provo City v. Thompson, 44 P.3d 828, 833 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002) 
The Court then looked at the second part of subsection (b). This part m subsection (b) 
prohibits "causing the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or continuously 
"been told not to call back," and when one acts with the requisite intent. Utah Code Ann. 76-9 
201(l)(b) (1999). In order to conclude that a statute is unconstitutionally oveproad "where 
conduct and not merely speech is involved... the overbreadth of a statute musf not only be real, 
but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick v. 
the repeated calls 
when one has 
[The court 
held that "unlike 
the second part of 
(Ut. Ct. App. 2002). 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). 
distinguished between the first part of subsection (b) and the second part andl 
subsection (a) and the first part of subsection (b), any possible overbreadth q 
subsection (b) is not substantial. Provo City v. Thompson, 44 P.3d 828, 834 
"The distinguishing factor of the second part of subsection (b) is that to be pitosecuted under it, 
on must have been told not to call back and yet, with the requisite intent, nevertheless then 
'causes the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or continuously." Id. "The right of free 
speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so 
there must be opportunity to win their attention." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87, 69 S.Ct. 
448, 454, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949). (emphasis added). Clearly, there is no right to audibly invade 
another's home or place of business by telephone ring in an attempt to comrrjiandeer her listening 
10 
ear when she has affirmatively expressed a desire to be left alone. Cf Id. at 87-88, 69 S.Ct. at 
454. 
OVERBREADTH CHALLENGE TO UTAH CODE ANN. 76-9-201 IS VALID. 
The Supreme Court has stated that when a statute or ordinance aims at penalizing an 
unprotected class of speech, it "must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish 
only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression." Gooding 
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1106. See also Logan City v. Ruber, 786 P.2d at 
1375 (Utah App. 1990). The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech do not allow the 
government to punish words outside of "narrowly limited classes of speech." Ruber, 786 P.2d at 
1374. An overbroad enactment is one "'which does not aim specifically at evils within the 
allowable area of state control, but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities that 
in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or the press.'" Ruber, 786 
P.2d at 1375 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97, 60 S.Ct. 736, 741-42, 84 L.Ed. 
1093(1940)). 
The merit of a First Amendment overbreadth challenge is determined by analyzing two 
factors: (1) Whether the statute's "'deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both real and 
substantial;' and (2) Whether the statute is 'readily subject to a narrowing construction by the 
state courts.'" State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837, 841 (Utah 1978) (quoting Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2276, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975)). If the statute's 
deterrent effect on protected expression is both real and substantial and the statute is not readily 
subject to a narrowing construction by state courts then it is unconstitutionally overbroad. 
Petitioner states that the Appellate Court incorrectly applied the "overbreadth" doctrine to 
11 
this case and then cites examples where the Utah Supreme Court has defined this doctrine. "A 
statute will not be held overbroad unless it makes unlawful a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah App. 
1997). Petitioner argues that Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201 is only directed against offensive 
conduct and not any legitimate communications of ideas (emphasis added). Petitioner then 
makes the argument that this takes the speech out of the protective realm of constitutionally 
protected speech under the 1st Amendment. However, Petitioner ignores the fact that the Court 
of Appeals expressly found that Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201 specifically made illegal legitimate 
forms of communication which are protected by the Constitution. Under the Act a telemarketer 
could be prosecuted because he was calling knowing that it was likely that the call would harass. 
As Respondent has already argued, Utah's telephone harassment statute has a real and 
substantial deterrent effect on protected speech. For example, the statute precludes one from 
making a telephone call with intent to "alarm" another. The deterrent effect of this language on 
constitutionally protected speech has no limits. This overbroad choice of words conceivably 
makes it criminal in Utah to call one's neighbor and warn him that his house is on fire, or to call 
a friend and forecast an approaching storm. See Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80, 83 (Col. 1975). 
The statute also precludes one from making a telephone call with intent to "annoy" 
another. There are many instances where one may call another with the intention of causing 
slight annoyance for perfectly legitimate constitutionally protected purposes.] 
statute could make criminal a single telephone call made by the following : 
consumer who wishes to express dissatisfaction over the performance of a pfoduce or service; a 
businessman disturbed with another's failure to perform a contractual obligation; an irate citizen 
Conceivably, this 
individuals: a 
12 
who wishes to complain to a public official; an individual bickering over family matters; or a 
creditor seeking to collect payment of a past due bill. See People v. Klick, 362 N.E.2d 329, 331-
32(111.1977). 
The term "harass" as used in the statute is merely a persistent annoyance and should be 
considered on the same guidelines as "annoy." Conceivably, this statute could make criminal 
repeated telephone calls made by the following individuals: a consumer who wishes to express 
dissatisfaction over the performance of a produce or service that continues to fails after being 
repaired. Indeed the "lemon laws" to handle such situations expect the dissatisfaction of a 
consumer who expresses dissatisfaction on more than one occasion.; a businessman disturbed 
with another's failure to perform a contractual obligation after being told once of the 
dissatisfaction but because of no change in behavior must call back and "harass"; or even a 
person/therapist/police officer attempting to stop a suicide and calling back to ensure the person 
does not harm herself. 
The First Amendment is made of "sterner stuff." Bolles, P.2d at 83. The people of Utah 
must not live in continual fear that something they say over the telephone with intent to "annoy", 
"harass", "offend", or "alarm" the listener will invoke the statute. Free speech may best fulfill its 
high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with present conditions 
or even stirs people to anger. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52, 85 S.Ct. 453, 462-63, 13 
L.Ed.2d 471 (1965). 
Unquestionably, the State of Utah has a legitimate and substantial interest in protecting its 
residents from fear and abuse at the hands of persons who employ the telephone to torment 
others. United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3rd Cir. 1978); Klick, 362 N.E.2d at 331. 
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The State also has a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of its residents^ homes from the 
intrusion of unwanted and perverse phone calls. City of Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617, 619 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984). However, the means chosen by the legislature to address these interests 
sweep too broadly. Clearly, the legislature failed in its duty to employ the least drastic means 
available to achieve these purposes. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 
L.Ed.2d231 (1960). 
Utah's telephone harassment statute is not limited to intrusions into thi home. 
Furthermore, it is not limited to communications which abuse the listener "in an essentially 
intolerable manner" as required by the Constitution when the government seeks to "shut off 
discourse solely to protect others from hearing it." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21, 91 
S.Ct. 1780, 1786, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). Plainly, the statute lacks the "precision of regulation" 
required by a statute "so closely touching our most precious freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). Thus, the deterrent jffect of the statrite 
on legitimate speech is both real and substantial. 
NARROWING JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION GOES AG^NST 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-9-201 is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the 
State's courts. While Utah courts favor construing a law so as to carry out its legislative intent 
and avoiding constitutional conflicts, it will not rewrite a statute or ignore its 
City Corp. V. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989); Salt Lake City v. Lopl 
1262 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997); Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1377 (Ut. c{ 
may argue that the statute should be narrowly construed to prohibit phone 
plain intent. Provo 
fa, 935 P.2d 1259, 
.App. 1990). One 
made "with intent calls 
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to annoy, alarm... or frighten any person...," but only when made for no lawful purpose. While 
such a narrowing construction of the statute may eliminate some of its constitutional 
inadequacies, it is clear that the legislature did not intend to qualify the statute in that manner. In 
1994, the statute was amended to delete words "without purpose of lawful communications." 
Hence, narrowly construing the statue to apply only in situations where the phone call was made 
for a now lawful purpose would do "impermissible violence to the clear language of the 
ordinance." Willden, 768 P.2d at 458, and would be contrary to the legislature's plain intent. 
EXAMPLES OF OVERBROAD TELEPHONE HARASSMENT STATUTES. 
Several courts have held statutes similar to the one at issue here to be unconstitutional on 
grounds of overbreadth. E.g., People v. Klick, 362 N.E. 2d 329 (111. 1977); Bolles v. People, 541 
P.2d 80 (Colo. 1975) (en banc); City of Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
The language of these statutes and Utah's statute is clearly distinguishable from the narrowly 
tailored telephone harassment statutes cited by the Petitioner and upheld in Iowa v. Jaeger, 249 
N.W. 2d 688 (Iowa 1977), Jones v. Municipality of Anchorage, 754 P.2d 275 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1988), and Arizona v. Hagen, 558 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). Similar to Utah's statute, 
these statutes specified the intent with which the call must be made; however, contrary to Utah's 
statute, these valid statutes also specify the nature of the speech prohibited (e.g., obscene, lewd, 
profane, and threatening). The categories of language prohibited by these statutes are consistent 
with those held to be unprotected by the Constitution in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). Subsections 1(a) and (b) of Utah's telephone 
harassment statute, on the other hand, make no attempt to specify the nature of speech prohibited. 
As in the case at hand subsections (a) and (b) directly apply. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent asks this court to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and find that 
Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201 is unconstitutionally overbroad. Respondent has stpding to challenge 
the constitutionality of the telephone harassment statute as applied to the facts of this case. He 
also has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on its face. The subject statute 
has a real and substantial deterrent effect on protected speech and the statute is not readily subject 
to a narrowing construction by the state's courts; therefore the decision of the| 
that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad should stand. 
Court of Appeals 
DATED this _J_ 
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